Wie viel Euro kostet ein Supra?

Inhaltsverzeichnis:

1. Wie viel Euro kostet ein Supra?
2. Wie viel kostet eine Supra mk5?
3. Wie teuer ist der teuerste Supra?
4. Wie viel kostet ein MK4 Supra?
5. Wie viel kostet der günstigste Supra?
6. Was kostet eine Supra in Japan?
7. Wie viel kostet die teuerste Supra Mk4?
8. Wie viel PS hat der stärkste Supra?
9. Wie viel PS hat ein Supra MK 5?
10. Wie viel kmh fährt eine Supra?
11. Ist Supra in Deutschland legal?
12. Wie viel kmh fährt ein Supra?
13. Wie viel PS hat die stärkste Supra?
14. Wie viele Gänge hat ein Supra?
15. Was ist der schnellste Supra?

Wie viel Euro kostet ein Supra?

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Wie viel kostet eine Supra mk5?

• sehr viel Fahrspaß dank starker, mit BMW entwickelter Motoren.
• die fünfte Generation bietet viele Techniken und einen hohen Komfort.
• modernes, auffälliges Design mit einem beeindruckenden Charakter.
• alltagstauglich dank 290 Litern Kofferraumvolumen.
• günstige Einstiegspreise für preisbewusste Kunden.

Klassifiziert als Sportwagen setzt der japanische Toyota Supra auch in der aktuell fünften Generation auf spezielle Motoren. Diese entstammen einer engen Zusammenarbeit mit dem deutschen Autobauer BMW und versprechen eine hohe Zuverlässigkeit bei maximalem Fahrspaß. Zwei Motoren mit vier oder sechs Zylindern werden für die europäischen Kunden angeboten.

Dabei ist bereits der Einstiegsmotor im Modell Toyota GR Supra 2.0 alles andere als langsam. Das Aggregat erbringt eine maximale Leistung von 258 PS bei einem Drehmoment von 400 Nm. Das kompakte und leichte Sportfahrzeug beschleunigt dank der perfekten Optimierung innerhalb von lediglich 5,2 Sekunden auf 100 km/h und die Höchstgeschwindigkeit beträgt 250 km/h, ab hier greift eine elektronische Abregelung. Der Benzinverbrauch liegt bei etwa 6,2 Litern, gerechnet auf 100 Kilometer Fahrstrecke.

Wie teuer ist der teuerste Supra?

Mrz 07, 2023

Test Toyota Supra: Seit die japanische Traditionsmarke hierzulande keine dicken Geländewagen mehr anbietet, ist der in Graz auf BMW-Basis gebaute Supra tatsächlich das teuerste Modell in der Palette – als neue (2700 Euro teure) „Moonstone Edition“ kommt er sogar auf über 80.000 Euro. Highlight neben der mattweißen Lackierung und der braunen Lederausstattung ist natürlich das neue manuelle Getriebe. Formal machen drei Pedale keinen Sinn: Dadurch wird der Supra durstiger, somit NoVA-bedingt auch teurer, 0 auf 100 vergehen drei Zehntel langsamer und einen Abstandsregel-Tempomat gibt es hier auch nicht.

Wie viel kostet ein MK4 Supra?

Inhalt von

Damals kein Erfolg in Deutschland, heute ein gesuchter Klassiker. Die Supra mit Riesen-Spoiler hatte es schwer bei uns. Auch wegen ihres hohen Preises.

Wie viel kostet der günstigste Supra?

Toyota Supra Neuwagen und Gebrauchtwagen werden bei heycar immer mit Garantie und nur von ausgewählten Händlern verkauft. Hier gibt es günstige Preise, exklusive Sonderangebote sowie die sofortige Verfügbarkeit der Neufahrzeuge.

Der günstigste Toyota Supra neu kostet 54890 €. Die Preise unterscheiden sich jedoch mitunter deutlich – je nachdem welche Austattung du wählst oder ob es aktuelle Angebote gibt.

Was kostet eine Supra in Japan?

09. August 2021 um 14:43 Uhr

Die aktuelle Supra ist erst seit etwa zweieinhalb Jahren auf dem Markt und doch hat die Baureihe schon mehr Sondereditionen hervorgebracht, als wir zählen können. Nun kommt eine weitere hinzu, denn Toyota bringt in Japan eine 35th Anniversary Special Edition auf den Markt, um die dreieinhalb Jahrzehnte zu feiern, seit denen die Supra ein eigenständiger Sportwagen ist. Zur Erinnerung: Zwischen 1978 und 1986 war die Supra "nur" eine Celica-Version.

Wie viel kostet die teuerste Supra Mk4?

Kein Meister des Understatements: Diese/r „Wasabi Supra” mit 2800 PS-Hemi-V8 und Mega-Turbo hat ordentlich Feuer. Veröffentlicht am 17.01.2020 Mit Zurückhaltung hat diese/r Supra* nichts am Hut. Die Tuningschmiede ProSpeed Autosports aus Houston in Texas hat es sich zur Aufgabe gemacht, den Supra MKIV zum Drag Racing-Overlord umzurüsten. Als Herzstück fungiert ein Hemi-V8 von Arrow Machine, der mit einem gigantischen Precision-Turbolader auf eine Leistung von über 2.800 PS kommen soll.

Wie viel PS hat der stärkste Supra?

29.10.2014—

Wie viel PS hat ein Supra MK 5?

• Zweisitziger Sportwagen mit Längsmotor und Hinterradantrieb 
• Technisch identisch zum BMW Z4 
• Innen viel Nähe zum BMW, außen eigene Formen  
• Präzise, sportliche Abstimmung 
• Nervöse Lenkung 

An dieser Stelle rollen die meisten Supra-Fans genervt mit den Augen. Zu den größten Qualitäten des Modells gehört eigentlich ein fantastischer, Toyota-eigener Reihensechszylinder. Zuletzt leistet der als Saugmotor („2JZ-GE“) 220 PS oder mit zwei Turboladern („2JZ-GTE“) 330 PS. Dass ein BMW-Sechszylinder („B58“) Supra Nummer fünf antreibt, gilt in Fankreisen als grenzwertig. Der Basis-Vierzylinder (ebenfalls von BMW) ist fast schon unverzeihlich. 

Ohne historische Vorbelastung bleibt wenig Drama, dafür ein guter Kompromiss: Vierzylinder haben in Sportwagen längst eine Daseinsberechtigung. Das beweisen unter anderem Lotus Elise und Mazda MX-5. Akustisch fehlt der Vierzylinder-Supra das Volumen, trotz sportlicher Note im Auspuff. Dynamisch haben wir wenig auszusetzen: Die volle Kraft steht früh an und hält lange durch. Bis Tempo 100 vergehen kaum mehr als fünf Sekunden. Erst bei wirklich hohem Tempo fehlt dem Motor der Biss. 

Wie viel kmh fährt eine Supra?

Der von Frühjahr 1978 bis Sommer 1981 gebaute erste Supra wurde noch als Spitzenversion der Celica zuerst in Japan und später in den USA angeboten.

Das offiziell Celica XX Supra genannte Modell wurde mit dem 2,6-Liter-Sechszylinder-Motor (4M-E) und 82 kW (110 PS) angeboten. Es handelt sich um ein SOHC-Triebwerk mit 2-Ventil-Technik und herkömmlicher Spulenzündung (Batteriezündung). In einigen Regionen stand auch der 2,0-Liter-Sechszylinder-Motor M-TE mit Turboaufladung und 108 kW (145 PS) zur Verfügung.

Weitere Unterschiede zum normalen Celica waren ein verlängerter Radstand (der Wagen wurde vor der Fahrgastzelle verlängert), eine umfangreichere Ausstattung sowie motorenseitig Leichtmetall-Zylinderköpfe mit zwei obenliegenden Nockenwellen und Saugrohreinspritzung. Zusätzlich wurde die Front abgeändert und der Grill ist in Form eines "T" gestaltet.

Toyota Celica Supra (1981–1985)

Die zweite Generation wurde im Herbst 1981 präsentiert.

Auch sie war immer noch als Derivat des Celica Liftback erkennbar, hatte aber mit den neuen 125 kW (170 PS) starken 2,8-Liter-6-Zylinder-Motoren 5M-GE und 5M-E (beide für Europa) einen komplett eigenständigen Antrieb. Optisch unterschied sich der Celica Supra durch die breitere B-Säule sowie durch die anders geformte Front.

Ist Supra in Deutschland legal?

International criminal law (ICL) is an achievement, but at the same time a challenge to the traditional conception of the principle of legality (lex praevia, scripta, and stricta – Sect. 1). International criminal tribunals have often based conviction for international crimes on unwritten norms the existence and scope of which they have failed to substantiate. In so doing, they have evaded the objection that they were applying ex post facto criminal laws. This approach, the relaxation of the concept of law by including norms whose existence is doubtful, has apparently served to maintain a concept of strict legality, but it is unsatisfying (Sect. 2). In my opinion, the strict principle of legality that has linked its absolute validity to the positivity of law is not the correct premise. It makes sense to state that positivity and validity do not necessarily go hand in hand (Sect. 3). Applied to ICL, this means that it is neither necessary nor convincing to “conceal” supra-positive law as positive law, as some decisions of the international criminal tribunals do. For this reason, I consider that Radbruch’s formula, consisting in admitting that there are supra-positive limits which positive law must respect in order to be valid, is well-founded (Sect. 4). The path taken by this significant philosopher of law is methodologically convincing, and it squarely faces the problem of the value of positive law. Nevertheless, if we admit Radbruch’s formula and thereby the limited value of positive law (if we claim that the validity of the law depends on it respecting supra-positive minimums of justice), we must also face the problem of the definition of supra-positive values, the epistemological difficulties of having access to them (Sect. 5), and the question of the scope and enforceability of supra-positive law (Sect. 6). In summary, this article aims to explain why Radbruch’s formula offers a convincing conceptual basis for international criminal legality and, in doing so, aims to contribute to the discussion about the foundations of ICL.

In the past, the international community attempted to prevent the atrocities committed during armed conflicts through the well-known international conventions of The Hague and Geneva, which contain the laws and customs of war and the so-called humanitarian international law. Those conventions were addressed to states, obliging them to organize their warfare according to those international undertakings. In this context, citizens of the respective states were regarded by those international law provisions only indirectly, since they were solely submitted to the sovereignty of their state, not to any authority beyond its national borders. However, insofar as these conventions attempted to reduce the violence of armed conflicts, they did not succeed, and – according to some scholars – this lack of effectiveness fed the idea of creating individual criminal responsibility at an international level.Footnote 1 Hence, this new kind of responsibility was not the result of reflection on the (possible) relationship between individuals (citizens under the sovereignty of a state) and an international legal order, but of the aim to find another, more promising instrument to reduce the violence of war. That was the background of the well-known proposal of installing an international tribunal to judge the war criminals of the Franco-German war, formulated by Gustave Moynier, as well as the attempt to prosecute German war criminals according to the Treaty of Versailles concluded in 1919. That aim explains (at least, in part) why the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg (IMTN) had to be installed: after World War II a response to the atrocities of National Socialism was needed and, since a clear and convincing answer to the crimes was necessary and urgent, the IMTN was installed without any in-depth conceptual discussion of its foundations. This atmosphere of urgency has almost always accompanied the history of international criminal law (ICL) – except in the case of the International Criminal Court (ICC) – and it has likewise affected the corresponding conceptual set-up of this area of law. If we observe the history of ICL from the perspective of its results, establishing an international criminal responsibility of individuals can be acclaimed as a great achievement, since it means a juridification of the responses to crimes, and this lends greater legitimacy to such responses. Paradigmatically, the international criminal responsibility established by the IMTN Statute was a more legitimate answer than the summary execution of the German war criminals proposed in the discussions among the Allied powers.Footnote 2 However, if we consider the history of ICL from the perspective of the construction of its theoretical foundations, an ICL addressed to individuals implies a real metamorphosis of the relationship between the citizen and the international legal order.Footnote 3 This substantial element cannot be ignored, drowned out by euphoric attitudes: certainly, ICL is an achievement, but it is also a difficult challenge to explain the foundations of this new international individual criminal responsibility. As George P. Fletcher and David Ohlin noted correctly: “The historical transition from the Geneva Conventions to the Rome Statute also signaled an under-theorized shift from state and communal responsibility to the prosecution of individuals for the same actions that were previously the basis for state responsibility.”Footnote 4 This under-theorization concerns many substantial issues of ICL and scholarly work in order to provide a theoretical basis to this new area of law that, sit venia verbo, was born and developed in a (justified) hurry. In this regard, the specificity of ICL cannot be reduced to the fact that its sources are not domestic but international (art. 38 Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ-St)). Moreover, these new (from the perspective of traditional criminal law) sources of criminal responsibility imply the emergence of a new relationship between the citizen and the international legal order, which has to be explained without the support of a common (stand-alone, universal) international criminal legal tradition.Footnote 5 Besides, in this search for the foundations of ICL we should never forget the main driver of its existence: to give a serious answer (punishment) to crimes of the utmost gravity (specially) in cases where the sovereign state that was expected to react instead did nothing, or even protected the criminals and/or was involved in the crimes. This constant aim in the history of ICL is already a reason to formulate the hypothesis that ICL is based on the premise of the primacy of a (minimum) natural law beyond the sovereignty of states, positive bills, and statutes.

One of the substantial issues regarding ICL foundations concerns the principle of legality as an essential principle in traditional CL. In ICL, we may speak of a real relativization of the principle of legality (some scholars even speak of “erosion”Footnote 6).Footnote 7 A significant factor leading to this relativization is that the international criminal responsibility of individuals is based in part on non-written provisions (therefore, lex non-scripta), which do not have the democratic foundations intrinsic to traditional criminal law,Footnote 8 have vague contours (therefore, lex non-certa)Footnote 9 and whose existence may be even unsure. The natural objection against this first statement would be that ICL should not pretend to assume a principle of criminal legality in terms of continental law but admit that the creation of law is largely in the hands of the judges and tribunals, in the way we know from the common law. According to that, in the frame of a common-law-based conception of legality, the vagueness of the sources of art. 38 ICJ-St should be seen not as a problem but as the space in which judges contribute to the creation of law with their decisions. Therefore, the openness of the English law tradition to precedent and most notably to equity (supra-positive law) would suit ICL more than the strict continental legality would do so. Yet, the conditions underlying a common-law-coined ICL do not mirror those of traditional (criminal) common law: common law has a legal tradition which does not exist in ICL.Footnote 10 In my opinion, it is precisely this lack of an international criminal legal tradition, along with the reluctance of sovereign states to assume regulations to which they have not agreed, that can explain why ICL has chosen (mainly) the path of conventional ICL: paradigmatically, the Statute for the International Criminal Court (ICC-St). Yet, custom and general principles of law have played a role in criminal proceedings before the international criminal tribunals and even in national criminal proceedings with an international dimension (clearly in the Berlin Wall shootings case),Footnote 11 and they therefore deserve attention.

If we put aside the question of the lack of an international criminal legal tradition, which could have helped to compensate for the vagueness of customs and general principles of law (i.e. to guide the judicial creation of ICL), and focus on the way international criminal tribunals dealt with this vagueness, we can ascertain that in the cases in which those tribunals were creating law, since there was no positive law criminalizing the conduct of the accused at the time it was committed, they “presented” their decisions as “acknowledgement” of positive law. As I explore in Sect. 2, there was an interest in explaining the decisions as “mere enforcement” of pre-existing positive law and this led to a “flexibilization” of the concept of “law” in order to incorporate customs or principles of law whose existence was actually doubtful. Otherwise, it would have been necessary to admit that ex post facto criminal law was being applied.

It is worth analyzing how ICL has dealt with the problem of substantiating the punishment of individuals in cases where there is doubt about the criminalization of their actions in international sources at the time of their commission. This was the problem faced by the IMTN and other international criminal tribunals that were installed ex post facto. In order to avoid the objection that they were applying retroactively unfavorable criminal provisions, those tribunals had to “find” an (international criminal) source of law that criminalized that conduct and was in force at the time of the commission of the crimes. In the framework of continental criminal law subject to the principle of lex scripta, the question of whether there is a law criminalizing certain conduct can be resolved with some ease. In contrast, in the framework of ICL, which has unwritten sources (custom, general principles of law), it makes sense to discuss the content and validity of these unwritten norms. Well, it is within this space of discussion that the international courts have developed their argumentation and, I advance here, have “found” the solution to maintaining a strict prohibition on retroactivity in ICL (although, as I will explain below, in my opinion, this solution is not convincing).

Indeed, the first thing that stands out when analyzing international criminal legality is that there are unwritten sources (customs, general principles of law) and that in some cases serious doubts exist about their scope and even their very existence. Such doubts are alarming if we consider that these sources have been the basis of international criminal decisions (for instance, the IMTN Judgment). The problem can be observed firstly in customary ICL, the very existence of which is sometimes uncertain, due to the dubious fulfillment of the elements of this source of law.Footnote 12 Customary law is “evidence of a general practice accepted as law” (art. 38 ICJ-St), which means that its emergence requires both a repetitio facti (settled practice) and an opinio iuris (belief that this practice is rendered obligatory).Footnote 13 In other words, custom is a generalized practice of the states supported by the conviction of its legal bindingness, an institutionalization of an extended practice.Footnote 14 Hence, first is the practice and then the conviction on its bindingness. However, in ICL, the existence of customs establishing the punishability of certain international crimes has often been asserted despite the lack of a practice by states of punishing those crimes.Footnote 15 This lack of state practice cannot be remedied by saying the states expressed themselves to be in favor of the punishment.Footnote 16 In view of this problem, it is natural to abandon the path of custom and appeal to the general principles of law, which do not require any practice by states, but only the conviction on bindingness.Footnote 17 However, apart from the epistemological problem concerning access to those principles,Footnote 18 scholars question the legitimacy of founding criminal liability on those principles,Footnote 19 especially because of its general nature.Footnote 20

Yet, doubts about the existence and scope of non-written ICL provisions have not been openly addressed in international criminal jurisprudence, many decisions instead choosing to tiptoe around the problem. An example is to be found in the decisions of the IMTNFootnote 21 and later the decisions of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).Footnote 22 Of course, it would have been a strong statement to say openly that the crimes to be punished were not criminalized in (written or non-written) positive law provisions, since that would have meant the relativization of the positive law in its capacity to protect the citizen against ex post facto criminal law application. The achievement of the rule of law, namely limiting the state’s ius puniendi (its right to punish citizens) through the positivized law, would have ceased being a formal absolute guarantee and would have become a material relativized guarantee, because it could fail in case of priority of other interests.Footnote 23 Instead of facing this problem, these courts preferred to construct their solutions on the assumption that there was a prior positive law (lex praevia) providing a basis for the punishment of the international crimes. However, such an assumption was, in my opinion, insufficiently founded.Footnote 24 It is convenient to take a closer look at it.

As mentioned, one of the main concerns of ICL is those cases in which the most grave crimes (in a material sense) are permitted (or at least not punished) according to the positive law in force at the time the individual committed the crimes. If, as in the case of National Socialist Germany or the GDR, there is positive law that permits conducts that we consider serious crimes (killing the disabled, shooting unarmed people trying to cross the border), if we assume a principle of the absolute validity of positive law, we must conclude that in such cases the only possible answer is an acquittal. The latter is an unbearable consequence and, in order to avoid it, the right path consists in assuming that extremely unjust positive laws are not law. But this last statement must be based not only on the aim of avoiding the undesired consequences of a strong positivism (in the sense of separation between validity and morality of laws), i.e. the impunity of serious crimes in National Socialist Germany or the GDR, but also on theoretical reasoning. Therefore, before addressing the theoretical solutions to this problem and, above all, Radbruch’s proposal, it is appropriate to clarify my opinion on the traditional (strong) conception of the principle of legality, as well as on the relationship between the validity of positive law and its content. In doing so, I do not intend to formulate any new thesis regarding the discussion between positivist and non-positivist positions (or among the different versions of legal positivism), but rather to make clear the conception to which I adhere and the reasons why I do so.

Traditionally, criminal law has been linked to the idea of a strong legality, at least in the framework of continental law: positive law (praevia, stricta and scripta) constitutes a protection for the citizen. According to that conception, only the positive law as a nation’s democratic oeuvre (self-legislation) is entitled to define which behaviors (or omissions) are crimes and therefore punishable. The argumentative circle contained in this conception could be considered a kind of closed loop, if its premises were correct. Yet, the premises crumble at so many points that it can hardly be said that the principle is still valid in all its scope. It would be overly ambitious to attempt to discuss this giant topic here. My aim is much more modest, namely to acknowledge two weak points of this conception, which have important consequences for the construction of legality in criminal law and thereby in ICL.

On the one hand, the expectation, associated with the traditional lex praevia principle, that positive law should be capable of completely defining crimes (through Special and General Part provisions) is at least utopic, not only because of the limits of the language as a means of definition of a clear semantic field, but also because the law needs the essential complement of criminal dogmatics (i.e., the criminal law science that establishes the foundations and criteria for imputation of criminal responsibility). The consequences are obvious: firstly, the mere wording of the law has neither the ability to define the scope of the crime nor therefore the ability to produce the expected legal certainty (foreseeability). In this sense, the jurisprudence of many constitutional courts has already recognized that no legal certainty exists if its only support is the mere wording of the law.Footnote 41 The latter is only capable of producing “semantic certainty.” If the law must offer real guidance to its addressees, in the sense of legal certainty, this aim can only be reached by the accumulation of semantic, axiological, and interpretative foreseeability. This means that the protection of the citizen from the state cannot be provided solely by the positive law but by the result of adding positive law, principles, and criminal law science (i.e., dogmatics). Consequently, the law that is applied to the citizen is not fully defined by positive law provisions but by both positive law and jurisprudence, which is the door through which the third element, i.e., criminal law science, enters into the creation of law. In other words, not even the most perfect penal code can offer, through provisions in its Special Part and General Part, definitions that imply foreseeability for the law’s addressee as to how that positive law will be interpreted and, thus, what the scope of that law’s enforcement will be. The evident second consequence is that the idea of criminal positive law as self-legislation fades because the law to be applied to the citizen is not the sole (democratic legitimated) positive law, but the sum of the latter and the principles and criteria of imputation of responsibility (which do not enjoy formal democratic legitimacy). Thus, positive law is only a (relevant but modest) frame for the construction both of the concept of crime and the norm addressed to the citizen. That is clear in the civil law tradition. However, it would be possible to raise the objection that these reflections are not valid for the common law, bearing in mind that precedent is a source of law and not, as in civil law, mere law enforcement.Footnote 42 Indeed, where judicial precedent is a source of law, the interpretative criteria are integrated into positive law, providing the law with greater precision and thus generating greater foreseeability. Now, precedent is not only a source, but also has its material sources, namely, the principles and constructions of criminal science; and such principles and scientific constructions are those which, at the same time, offer a safe framework to define what is foreseeable, in the light of the written laws and, where appropriate, the precedents that may exist.

Wie viel kmh fährt ein Supra?

 Toyota GR Supra 3.0 TestwagenBaujahr01/2019 bis 06/2020Testdatum07/2019AntriebZylinderzahl / Motorbauart6-Zylinder ReihenmotorEinbaulage / Richtungvorne / längsHubraum / Verdichtung2998 cm³ / 11,0:1AufladungAbgasturbolader (1,0 bar)Leistung250 kW / 340 PS bei 5000 U/minmax. Drehmoment500 Nm bei 1600 U/minVerbrennungsverfahrenOttoNockenwellenantriebKetteAntriebsartHinterradantriebGetriebe8-Gang AutomatikgetriebeÜbersetzungenI. 5,25II. 3,36III. 2,17IV. 1,72V. 1,32VI. 1,00VII. 0,82VIII. 0,64R. 3,71Achsantrieb3,15:1Karosserie und AbmessungenTypCoupéTüren / Sitzplätze2 / 2Außenmaße4379 x 1854 x 1292 mmRadstand2470 mmSpurweite1594 / 1589 mmWendekreis11,4 / 11,2 mBodenfreiheit115 mmLadekantenhöhe840 mmInnenbreite1470 / – / – mmInnenhöhe980 / – / – mmSitztiefe510 / – / – mmKnickmaß1020 bis 1200 mmHüftpunkt390 / 770 mmLenkradumdrehungen2,25Lenkraddurchmesser370 mmKofferraumvolumen290 lGewichteLeergewicht1570 kgLeergewicht Testwagen1511 kgGewichtsverteilung51,4 / 48,6 %Zulässiges Gesamtgewicht1815 kgZuladung245 kgFahrwerk, Bremsen und RäderRadaufhängungEinzelradaufhängung / EinzelradaufhängungFederung Basis– / Luftfedern, StoßdämpfernFahrwerk TestwagenSerie / SerieStabilisatorenja / jaLenkerkonstruktionQuerlenkern / Querlenkern, LängslenkernLenkübersetzung15,1:1 / – / –BremsscheibenmaterialStahl / StahlReifenmarke / TypMichelin Pilot Super SportReifen255/35 R 19 Y / 275/35 R 19 YBeschleunigung0-50 km/h1,8 s0-60 km/h2,2 s0-80 km/h3,2 s0-100 km/h4,4 s0-120 km/h6,0 s0-130 km/h7,0 s0-140 km/h8,0 s0-160 km/h10,4 s0-180 km/h13,3 s0-200 km/h16,9 s60-100 km/h2,2 s80-120 km/h2,8 sHöchstgeschwindigkeit250 km/hBremsweg und Verzögerung100-0 km/h33,6 m / 11,5 m/s²130-0 km/h56,1 m / 11,6 m/s²130-0 km/h55,6 m / 11,7 m/s²190-0 km/h117,0 m / k.A.FahrdynamikSlalom 18 m69,5 km/hSlalom 18 m69,9 km/hDoppelter Spurwechsel137,5 km/hDoppelter Spurwechsel139,4 km/hGeräuscheInnengeräusch 80 km/h68 dB(A) (Automatik)Innengeräusch 100 km/h71 dB(A) (Automatik)Innengeräusch 130 km/h74 dB(A) (Automatik)Innengeräusch 160 km/h76 dB(A) (Automatik)Innengeräusch 180 km/h79 dB(A) (Automatik)Standgeräusch / max. Geräusch50 / 83 dB(A)Stand- / Fahrgeräusch90 / 68 dB(A)Verbrauch und EmissionswerteKraftstoffSuper BenzinTankvolumen / Reichweite52 l / 693 kmNEFZ-Verbrauch9,1 / 6,5 / 7,5 l/100 kmCO2-Ausstoß170 g/kmams-Eco-Verbrauch7,3 l/100 kmams-Pendler-Verbrauch9,6 l/100 kmams-Sportfahrer-Verbrauch12,7 l/100 kmGewichtung Testverbrauch15 / 70 / 15 %Testverbrauch9,7 l/100 kmCO2-Ausstoß226 g/kmSchadstoffeinstufungEuro 6d-TEMPEffizienzklasseDKostenGrundpreis61.314 €s in Deutschland erhältlich, und sie sollte hierzulande stets den Spoiler tragen. Doch Toyota reagierte auf die Kritik und bot die Supra ab 1994 auch ohne „Aerodynamik-Paket“ an. Wer mit seinem Heckflügel unzufrieden war, hatte Pech gehabt: Das Heckleitwerk war Teil der Betriebserlaubnis des Fahrzeugs, ein Abschrauben nicht erlaubt.

In 5,9 gemessenen Sekunden durchspurtete die Supra die 100er-Marke, nach 25,3 Sekunden lagen 200 km/h an – damit kann sie heute nicht mehr ganz vorne mitspielen, damals schon. Der ausladende Heckflügel soll bei einer Geschwindigkeit von 150 km/h rund 30 Kilo Abtrieb produzieren. Heute ein Witz, damals genial.

Wie viel PS hat die stärkste Supra?

 Toyota GR Supra 3.0 TestwagenBaujahr01/2019 bis 06/2020Testdatum07/2019AntriebZylinderzahl / Motorbauart6-Zylinder ReihenmotorEinbaulage / Richtungvorne / längsHubraum / Verdichtung2998 cm³ / 11,0:1AufladungAbgasturbolader (1,0 bar)Leistung250 kW / 340 PS bei 5000 U/minmax. Drehmoment500 Nm bei 1600 U/minVerbrennungsverfahrenOttoNockenwellenantriebKetteAntriebsartHinterradantriebGetriebe8-Gang AutomatikgetriebeÜbersetzungenI. 5,25II. 3,36III. 2,17IV. 1,72V. 1,32VI. 1,00VII. 0,82VIII. 0,64R. 3,71Achsantrieb3,15:1Karosserie und AbmessungenTypCoupéTüren / Sitzplätze2 / 2Außenmaße4379 x 1854 x 1292 mmRadstand2470 mmSpurweite1594 / 1589 mmWendekreis11,4 / 11,2 mBodenfreiheit115 mmLadekantenhöhe840 mmInnenbreite1470 / – / – mmInnenhöhe980 / – / – mmSitztiefe510 / – / – mmKnickmaß1020 bis 1200 mmHüftpunkt390 / 770 mmLenkradumdrehungen2,25Lenkraddurchmesser370 mmKofferraumvolumen290 lGewichteLeergewicht1570 kgLeergewicht Testwagen1511 kgGewichtsverteilung51,4 / 48,6 %Zulässiges Gesamtgewicht1815 kgZuladung245 kgFahrwerk, Bremsen und RäderRadaufhängungEinzelradaufhängung / EinzelradaufhängungFederung Basis– / Luftfedern, StoßdämpfernFahrwerk TestwagenSerie / SerieStabilisatorenja / jaLenkerkonstruktionQuerlenkern / Querlenkern, LängslenkernLenkübersetzung15,1:1 / – / –BremsscheibenmaterialStahl / StahlReifenmarke / TypMichelin Pilot Super SportReifen255/35 R 19 Y / 275/35 R 19 YBeschleunigung0-50 km/h1,8 s0-60 km/h2,2 s0-80 km/h3,2 s0-100 km/h4,4 s0-120 km/h6,0 s0-130 km/h7,0 s0-140 km/h8,0 s0-160 km/h10,4 s0-180 km/h13,3 s0-200 km/h16,9 s60-100 km/h2,2 s80-120 km/h2,8 sHöchstgeschwindigkeit250 km/hBremsweg und Verzögerung100-0 km/h33,6 m / 11,5 m/s²130-0 km/h56,1 m / 11,6 m/s²130-0 km/h55,6 m / 11,7 m/s²190-0 km/h117,0 m / k.A.FahrdynamikSlalom 18 m69,5 km/hSlalom 18 m69,9 km/hDoppelter Spurwechsel137,5 km/hDoppelter Spurwechsel139,4 km/hGeräuscheInnengeräusch 80 km/h68 dB(A) (Automatik)Innengeräusch 100 km/h71 dB(A) (Automatik)Innengeräusch 130 km/h74 dB(A) (Automatik)Innengeräusch 160 km/h76 dB(A) (Automatik)Innengeräusch 180 km/h79 dB(A) (Automatik)Standgeräusch / max. Geräusch50 / 83 dB(A)Stand- / Fahrgeräusch90 / 68 dB(A)Verbrauch und EmissionswerteKraftstoffSuper BenzinTankvolumen / Reichweite52 l / 693 kmNEFZ-Verbrauch9,1 / 6,5 / 7,5 l/100 kmCO2-Ausstoß170 g/kmams-Eco-Verbrauch7,3 l/100 kmams-Pendler-Verbrauch9,6 l/100 kmams-Sportfahrer-Verbrauch12,7 l/100 kmGewichtung Testverbrauch15 / 70 / 15 %Testverbrauch9,7 l/100 kmCO2-Ausstoß226 g/kmSchadstoffeinstufungEuro 6d-TEMPEffizienzklasseDKostenGrundpreis61.314 €s in Deutschland erhältlich, und sie sollte hierzulande stets den Spoiler tragen. Doch Toyota reagierte auf die Kritik und bot die Supra ab 1994 auch ohne „Aerodynamik-Paket“ an. Wer mit seinem Heckflügel unzufrieden war, hatte Pech gehabt: Das Heckleitwerk war Teil der Betriebserlaubnis des Fahrzeugs, ein Abschrauben nicht erlaubt.

In 5,9 gemessenen Sekunden durchspurtete die Supra die 100er-Marke, nach 25,3 Sekunden lagen 200 km/h an – damit kann sie heute nicht mehr ganz vorne mitspielen, damals schon. Der ausladende Heckflügel soll bei einer Geschwindigkeit von 150 km/h rund 30 Kilo Abtrieb produzieren. Heute ein Witz, damals genial.

Wie viele Gänge hat ein Supra?

Bild: Kevauto CC BY-SA 4.0 Link

In diesem Artikel sehen Sie die technischen Daten des Toyota Supra – unsere Daten werden regelmäßig aktualisiert und fehlende Modelle & Motoren werden automatisch ergänzt.

Was ist der schnellste Supra?

Die Spitzengeschwindigkeit lag bei 387 Stundenkilometern - und nach sechs Sekunden war die Fahrt bereits wieder vorbei. Mit einem Toyota Supra hat ein Dragster-Team einen neuen Geschwindigkeitsrekord aufgestellt.

28.10.2014, 18.55 Uhr